6 research outputs found
Embodying Artifact Production Knowledge
On a modified view of embodied cognition, I argue that the conceptual structure of some present-dayâs abstract artifact concepts such as PIECE OF MUSIC or PIECE OF ART can be effectively explained if it is taken into account that âvisual recordingsâ of first observed result objects played a major role in developing abstract artifact concepts
Political Bald-Faced Lies are Performative Utterances
Sometimes, political bald-faced lies pass for truth. That is, certain groups of people behave according to them â behave as if the political bald-faced lies were true. How can this phenomenon be explained? I argue that to explain it we need to take political bald-faced lies to be performative utterances whose goal is to bring about a worldly state of affairs just in virtue of making the utterance. When the former US-President tweeted âwe won the electionâ, people stormed Capitol Hill to protest election fraud and some were killed. In this way, the bald-faced lie was successful in passing for truth. My performative view of political bald-faced lies is to be preferred over various other views such as the contempt for truth view (Lynch 2021), the deception view (Lackey 2013), and the value-signaling view (Stanley 2012). These alternative views fail to adequately account for how political bald-faced lies pass for truth
Truth Dependence Against Transparent Truth
Beallâs (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for truth dependence, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are doesnât depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwichâs Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth